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INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 2001, the United States began transporting hundreds of per-
sons captured overseas in the "War on Terror" to the U.S. Naval Base at Guan-
tdnamo Bay, Cuba.' They were kept at Guantdnamo specifically to insulate from
judicial review the military's decision to detain them.' Seven years later, the Su-
preme Court in Boumediene v. Bush granted Guantdnamo detainees the right to
petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit.' The Court held that detainees must have "a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate that [they are] being held pursuant to the erroneous application or
interpretation of relevant law."4 The Court's central concern was with the ha-
beas court's power to admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence, a pow-
er necessary "[flor the writ of habeas corpus, or its substitute, to function."'
But while the Court's central preoccupation was with a habeas court's pow-
er to independently review the evidence, the Court did not enumerate any spe-
cific procedural requirements. The Court-hesitant to place burdens on the
military and cognizant of the need to protect classified information-sketched
only the broad outlines of what the Constitution requires.' In so doing, it left
"[t]he extent of the showing required of the Government in these cases... a
matter to be determined"' and charged the district courts with the task of ba-
lancing the government's legitimate interests against each detainee's right to
have a court assess the lawfulness of his detention.'
1. See Diane Marie Amann, Guantdnamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 267-68
(2004).
2. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 828 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Had the
law been otherwise, the military surely would not have transported prisoners
there, but would have kept them in Afghanistan, transferred them to another of
our foreign military bases, or turned them over to allies for detention."); Amann,
supra note i, at 267-68.
3. 553 U.S. at 798.
4. Id. at 779.
5. Id. at 790.
6. Id. at 788-89 (holding that the Constitution requires that those wrongfully held
must have the remedy of release, the power to challenge the legality of the law
pursuant to which they are detained, and an opportunity to present relevant ex-
culpatory evidence).
7. Id. at 787.
8. Id. at 796 ("[Tihe Government has a legitimate interest in protecting sources and
methods of intelligence gathering; and we expect that the District Court will use
its discretion to accommodate this interest to the greatest extent possible.").
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Since Boumediene, the courts within the D.C. Circuit have heard over sixty
habeas petitions from detainees at Guantilnamo Bay.9 At first, many writs were
granted. The lower courts applied a functional framework for determining the
admissibility, credibility, and probity of evidence, holding the government to
the ordinary burden of preponderance of the evidence.'o However, as the gov-
ernment and detainees began to appeal habeas decisions on the basis of adverse
evidentiary rulings, the Court of Appeals announced binding evidentiary rules
limiting the district courts' discretion to admit, exclude, weigh, and consider
evidence as the district courts saw fit."
This Note argues that these evidentiary rules deny detainees a "meaningful
opportunity" to contest the factual basis of their detention. The D.C. Circuit
maintains that it holds the government to a preponderance standard and has
cast its reversals of the District Court's grants of habeas corpus as mere correc-
tions in judging evidentiary probity. 4 However, in substance, the Court of Ap-
peals' evidentiary rules have quietly but significantly eroded the evidentiary
burden.
9. See Guantanamo Bay Habeas Decision Scorecard, CENTER CONST. RIGHTS,
http://ccrjustice.org/learn-more/faqs/guantanamo-bay-habeas-decision
-scorecard (last visited NOV. 22, 2012) (listing decided Guantinamo cases); Andy
Worthington, Guantdnamo Habeas Results: The Definitive List, ANDY WORTHING-
TON, http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/guantanamo-habeas-results-the
-definitive-list (last visited NOV. 22, 2012).
10. In eleven of the first seventeen habeas cases adjudicated in the district courts, the
district court granted the detainee's petition. After Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d
866, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010), five of the next eleven hearings also resulted in grants.
However, after Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2010), only a sin-
gle petition was granted. That grant was later vacated and remanded in Latif v.
Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
ni. See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes et al., The Emerging Law of Detention 2.o: The Guantd-
namo Habeas Cases as Lawmaking, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 2012),
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/reports/2on/5/Guantanamo
%2owittes/o5guantanamowittes (collecting cases and rulings).
12. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 729.
13. "Preponderance-of-the-evidence" is the evidentiary standard, though several
judges on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals have questioned whether a lower
standard would be appropriate. See, e.g., Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F-3d 1, 5 n.4
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman,
J., concurring); Latif 666 F-3d 748; Uthman v. Obama, 637 F-3d 400, 403 n-3 (D.C.
Cir. 2o1); Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 11o3; Al-Bihani, 590 F-3d at 878 n.4; Awad v. Ob-
ama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 120-122 (describing the ways in which the Court
of Appeals has characterized the District Court rulings as erroneous).
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The way in which the evidentiary standard and the evidentiary rules inte-
ract to weaken Boumediene has, for the most part, escaped scrutiny. 5 Many
have praised the D.C. Circuit for striking an appropriate balance between the
needs of national security and the rights of those wrongfully detained." But this
underestimates the combined significance of the D.C. Circuit's evidentiary rul-
ings. Boumediene's central purpose was to withhold from the executive branch
the unchecked power to detain whomever it deems a threat. 7 Yet the D.C. Cir-
cuit's evidentiary rules have empowered the government to detain upon so little
evidence that the habeas hearing no longer serves the checking role the Boume-
diene Court intended.'"
The D.C. Circuit has tacitly reduced the amount and quality of evidence
necessary to establish the lawfulness of detention through three powerful me-
chanisms: (1) all but eliminating corroboration requirements and restrictions
on the admissibility of hearsay evidence, no matter how unreliable;' 9 (2) estab-
lishing that courts consider the evidence in the "whole record" when determin-
ing whether a petitioner meets the requirements for detention-a determina-
tion that often reduces to the Court of Appeals' deciding that the District Court
15. Scholars have mentioned that the evidentiary rules might pose concerns about
compliance with Boumediene, but have ventured no further. See, e.g., Stephen I.
Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451, 1466-77
(2011) (suggesting that the D.C. Circuit Court's evidentiary burdens and pre-
sumptions may be inconsistent with Boumediene).
16. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the
Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 857-58 (2011); Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, Meeting
Boumediene's Challenge: The Emergence of an Effective Habeas Jurisprudence and
Obsolescence of New Detention Legislation, 95 MINN. L. REV. 244, 247 (2010); So-
phia Brill, Comment, The National Security Court We Already Have, 28 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 525 (2010); Wittes et al., supra note n1, at 49.
17. See 553 U.S. at 728.
18. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879 ("[T]he one constant in the history of habeas has
never been a certain set of procedures, but rather the independent power of a
judge to assess the actions of the Executive. This primacy of independence over
process is at the center of the Boumediene opinion, which eschews prescribing a
detailed procedural regime in favor of issuing a spare but momentous guarantee
that a 'judicial officer must have adequate authority to make a determination in
light of the relevant law and facts."' (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 787)); Ste-
phen I. Vladeck, Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation
of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2110 (2009) ("Reading Boumediene, one
is left with the distinct impression that for Justice Kennedy, at least, the writ of
habeas corpus is in part a means to an end-a structural mechanism protecting
individual liberty by preserving the ability of the courts to check the political
branches.").
19. See infra Part I.
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wrongly refused to credit sufficient government evidence;2 o and (3) developing
irrefutable presumptions of detainability in which a single fact once estab-
lished-such as a stay at an al-Qaeda affiliated guesthouse-is dispositive on
the question of detention, even when other facts in the record point strongly in
the opposite direction."
That these rules operate to significantly reduce the government's burden,
and thereby deprive detainees of a meaningful opportunity to contest the fac-
tual basis of their detention, is not readily apparent from the D.C. Circuit's de-
cisions. Rather, the D.C. Circuit has framed its successive evidentiary decisions
as meeting Boumediene's goal of striking a careful and necessary balance be-
tween the significant burdens that a higher evidentiary requirement would im-
pose on the military during wartime, and the minimal impact that these deci-
sions would have on the substantive rights of detainees in habeas proceedings."
This Note explains how, contrary to the Court of Appeals' rhetoric, these
evidentiary rules have played a dispositive role in the outcome of these cases.
Part I analyzes how the credibility rules established by the Court of Appeals re-
duce the government's evidentiary burden. Part II explains how the mosaic
theory that the Court of Appeals has imposed on the district courts often privi-
leges unreliable evidence. Finally, Part III demonstrates how the Court of Ap-
peals' development of irrefutable presumptions for establishing the lawfulness
of detention decreases the quality and amount of evidence that the government
must put forth to prove membership in al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated
groups. This Note concludes that the Court of Appeals' construction of eviden-
tiary rules and the interaction among them has taken the bite out of Boume-
diene, granting executive detention at Guantdnamo Bay judicial sanction with-
out judicial scrutiny.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III. The Court of Appeals does not call its evidentiary rules irrefut-
able or even presumptions. But, as we hope to show, these rules operate as irrefut-
able presumptions in all but name.
22. See, e.g., Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (arguing that other
cases in which the Court of Appeals reversed decisions by the District Court were
"not close" and that the application of the preponderance standard is "simpl[e]");
Latif v. Obama, 666 F-3d 746, 754-55 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (describing the dissent's fear
that the presumption of accuracy will be functionally irrefutable as "unfounded");
Uthman v. Obama, 637 F-3d 400, 407 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (describing circumstantial
evidence as "overwhelming").
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I. CREDIBILITY RULES23
The D.C. Circuit has almost entirely eliminated corroboration require-
ments and limitations on hearsay from post-Boumediene habeas hearings. In
January 2oo, in its first post-Boumediene habeas appeal, the D.C. Circuit held
in Al-Bihani v. Obama that district courts may not exclude hearsay evidence.
This groundbreaking shift in the structure of evidentiary consideration was
then followed with another change in Latif v. Obama, decided in October 2011,
where the D.C. Circuit found that government reports should be entitled to a
presumption of accuracy." In ordinary cases, waiving technical objections to
evidentiary admissibility is not necessarily unusual. When judges sit without ju-
ries, they sometimes relax the ordinary admissibility rules, arguing that they can
"let [the evidence] in and just give it the weight that it deserves."" Yet the com-
plex, uncertain, evidence-laden inquiries that the D.C. Circuit confronts in
post-Boumediene habeas cases are far from ordinary. There is far greater reason
to adhere to careful admissibility rules in these cases than in almost any other
kind of case." Moreover, because relaxing admissibility is ordinarily exception-
al, evidentiary rules maintain a strong deterrent and structuring effect in ordi-
nary trials that disappears when all such rules are eliminated prospectively.
23. "Credibility rules" are rules for structuring and assessing what evidence should be
believed. See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S Evi-
DENCE MANUAL §12.01[1], at 12-13 (2007) ("[T]he basic aim of all credibility rules
[is] that evidence should be admitted if it better enables the trier of fact to deter-
mine when a witness is lying or telling the truth."); see also United States v. Welsh,
774 F.2d 670, 672 (4th Cir. 1985) (discussing credibility and probity). Rules about
credibility can call for some evidence to be excluded or require that other kinds of
evidence be corroborated. In criminal law, for example, questions of credibility
abound. Did the witness lie? Was the confession false? Was the DNA sample con-
taminated? Credibility is conceptually distinct from "probity" or "relevance,"
however, both of which measure the degree to which evidence tends "to establish
the proposition it is offered to prove." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 541 (3d
ed. 1984). Credibility rules specifically govern whether evidence should be trusted
at all. Some forms of evidence, however, are excluded per se because of their uni-
versal tendency to mislead. The exclusion of hearsay and rudimentary corrobora-
tion requirements for admissibility "are at least as old as the common law itself."
Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 165, 168 (2006).
24. 590 F.3d 866, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
25. 666 F-3d at 750.
26. State v. Stout, 46 S.W-3d 689, 703 (Tenn. 2001) (adopting the principle that trial
judges should have "wider discretion than would normally be allowed under the
[state's] Rules of Evidence" (quoting State v. Sims, 45 S.W-3d 1, 14 (Tenn. 2001)));
see also Commonwealth v. Irwin, 639 A.2d 52, 54-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (noting
that the trial judge is presumed to be able to disregard prejudicial evidence).
27. See infra Section I.C for an in-depth discussion of the reasons why this is so.
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A. Hearsay
The Supreme Court seemingly left little room for the lower courts to admit
hearsay in detention hearings. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice O'Connor, writing
for a plurality, suggested that hearsay was only admissible when no better evi-
dence was available." Boumediene spoke in similarly general terms about the
"discretion" of the district courts to craft rules to vindicate "legitimate [gov-
ernment] interest[s]." 9 The D.C. Circuit's first tangles with hearsay reflected
this tentative approach. In Parhat v. Gates, the first case decided by the D.C.
Circuit after Boumediene, the Court of Appeals set a middle bar for the admis-
sion of hearsay: it "must be presented in a form, or with sufficient additional
information, that permits the Tribunal and court to assess its reliability."3 0 The
District Court formulated a similar rule in the Case Management Order they
adopted four months later,' writing that the habeas judge "may admit and con-
sider hearsay evidence . .. if. . . the hearsay evidence is reliable and ... the pro-
vision of nonhearsay evidence would unduly burden the movant or interfere
with the government's efforts to protect national security.""
The government took advantage of the courts' willingness to consider hear-
say under some circumstances to argue that it should be entitled to enter hear-
say in every subsequent case, asserting that any other rule would pose an "un-
due burden" under the Case Management Order. Responding to one such
motion in Bostan v. Obama, District Judge Reggie B. Walton wrote:
[Ilt is no excuse for the government's lawyers to assert that there are
too many habeas corpus petitions ... to compel fidelity to the centu-
ries-old proscription against the use of hearsay .. . Just as "the costs of
28. 542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004) (stating that hearsay "may need to be accepted as the
most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding"
(emphasis added)).
29. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796 (20o8) ("[W]e expect that the District
Court will use its discretion to accommodate [the Government's] interest to the
greatest extent possible.").
30. 532 F.3 d 834, 849 (D.C. Cir. 2008). It is worth noting that Parhat was not a habeas
case, but rather was a case on direct review to the D.C. Circuit under the Detainee
Treatment Act. Nevertheless, the proceeding reviewed a Combatant Status Review
Tribunal (CSRT) proceeding in a manner substantially identical to the habeas
proceedings that followed.
31. Following the Boumediene decision, most District Court judges "agreed to conso-
lidate their Guantinamo Bay habeas cases before former Chief Judge Thomas F.
Hogan for issuance of an initial case management order that would expeditiously
move these cases toward resolution." Al Odah v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1,
4 (D.D.C. 2009), affd, 611 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
32. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 02-cv-o828, 20o8 WL 4858241, at *3(D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008) (emphasis added).
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delay can no longer be borne by those who are held in custody," so,
too, the costs of this litigation... must be borne by the government,
not fobbed off on the petitioners in the form of a blanket presumption
of admissibility of otherwise inadmissible hearsay.3
Yet the Court of Appeals created just such a "blanket presumption" three
months after Bostan in Al-Bihani v. Obama.34 The Court of Appeals wrote that
"the question a habeas court must ask when presented with hearsay is not
whether it is admissible-it is always admissible-but what probative weight to
ascribe to whatever indicia of reliability it exhibits."35 The Court of Appeals rea-
soned that, as aliens, detainees lack Sixth Amendment rights,"6 that Hamdi and
Boumediene authorized the lower courts to consider hearsay,3 7 and that district
judges "need not be protected from unreliable information in the manner the
Federal Rules of Evidence aim to shield . .. impressionable juries." " Admitting
all hearsay and then discounting it appropriately, Judge Janice Rogers Brown
reasoned, is essential to achieving a court's overarching goal in detainee cases:
"seizing the actual truth of a simple, binary question: is detention lawful?"3 9
But it is difficult to fathom that admitting all hearsay furthers the goal of
"seizing the actual truth."4o Given that one of the very purposes of excluding
hearsay has always been to improve the accuracy of an evidentiary inquiry, ad-
mitting all hearsay is more likely to decrease, rather than increase, the accuracy
of these proceedings. In Al-Bihani itself, for example, the contested hearsay was
the petitioner's own statement, relayed first through an interpreter to an inter-
rogator, and then summarized by the interrogator in an interrogation report.4 1
Judge Brown admitted Al-Bihani's reported statements and credited the veraci-
ty of the reports in which they were contained on the grounds that "al-Bihani
did not contest the truth of the majority of his admissions upon which the dis-
trict court relied, enhancing the reliability of those reports." 42 Whether the re-
33. 662 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4-5 (D.D.C. 2009) (citation omitted). He went on to write that
"[t]he very notion that the Court should lower its standards of admissibility to
whatever level the government is prepared (or even able) to satisfy is contradicto-
ry to the fundamental principles of fairness that inform the Great Writ's exis-
tence." Id. at 5.
34. 590 F3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
35. Id. at 879.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 880.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 879.
42. Id. at 880 (emphasis added).
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port's author was even available to testify as to the accuracy of the disputed por-
tions went unexamined.43 Further, that Al-Bihani was available and willing to
testify, thus remedying the hearsay problem, was ignored.44
The decision of the Court of Appeals to admit all hearsay goes well beyond
the modest waivers that courts sometimes grant to technical hearsay. The na-
ture of the hearsay in detainee cases is generally of the most error-prone kind:
second- and third-hand statements, which seldom come from identified
sources. 45 Moreover, the sources of the hearsay, when they are identified, are
often adverse or unreliable witnesses, against whom confrontation would be
critical in an ordinary criminal trial.46 The fact that hearsay often forms the core
43. See infra Sec. II.A; cf Al-Bihani v. Obama, 662 F. Supp. 2d 9, 17-18 (D.D.C. 2009)
("The situation is more complicated with respect to statements made by other de-
tainees that the government seeks to use against the petitioner. The government
suggests that statements by various detainees inculpating the petitioner necessarily
inculpate the declarants as well and therefore should be considered as statements
against their interest under Federal Rule of Evidence 804. But that exception only
applies when the declarant is unavailable to testify within the meaning of the rule,
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3), and the government has not even attempted to demon-
strate unavailability on the part of the various detainees who allegedly inculpated
the petitioner.").
44. Al-Bihani, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (noting that "the petitioner is available to testify
and willing to be subject to cross-examination").
45. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2009) ("Given the exten-
sive briefing and oral argument presented by counsel during the discovery phase
of this case, as well [sic] the exhibits submitted at the merits trial, it is clear that
the accuracy of much of the factual material contained in those exhibits is hotly
contested for a host of different reasons ranging from the fact that it contains
second- and third-hand hearsay to allegations that it was obtained by torture to
the fact that no statement purports to be a verbatim account of what was said.");
see also Parhat v. Gates, 532 F-3d 834, 848-49 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("[T]he government
suggests that several of the assertions in the intelligence documents are reliable
because they are made in at least three different documents. We are not per-
suaded.... In fact, we have no basis for concluding that there are independent
sources for the documents' thrice-made assertions. To the contrary, as noted in
Part III, many of those assertions are made in identical language, suggesting that
later documents may merely be citing earlier ones, and hence that all may ulti-
mately derive from a single source. And as we have also noted, Parhat has made a
credible argument that-at least for some of the assertions-the common source
is the Chinese government, which may be less than objective with respect to the
Uighurs. Other assertions in the documents may ultimately rely on interview re-
ports (not provided to the Tribunal) of Uighur detainees, who may have had no
first-hand knowledge and whose speculations may have been transformed into
certainties in the course of being repeated by report writers.").
46. See, e.g., Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 56-60. In Ahmed the government's witnesses
were detainees, one of whom had "shown himself to be an unreliable source" and
another of whom suffered from "psychosis." Id. at 57, 58.
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of the government's case makes the D.C. Circuit's blanket presumption even
more troubling.47
Even if the D.C. Circuit had dispensed with the exacting hearsay rules re-
quired by the Federal Rules of Evidence, the admission of totally unreliable
hearsay needlessly elevates the risk of error. Assertions made by human beings
are often unreliable: such statements are often insincere, subject to flaws in
memory and perception, or infected with errors in narration at the time they
are given.41 Some have argued that more reliable evidence in the record can be
used to bolster the credibility and probity of hearsay evidence and that exclud-
ing hearsay evidence deprives the fact-finder of a potentially critical tile in an
otherwise incomprehensible evidentiary mosaic. 49 But given hearsay evidence's
inherent tendency to mislead, it is unclear what independent value hearsay is
expected to have-especially if it relies on other more reliable evidence in the
record to render it credible and probative."o At best, such unreliable evidence
can reinforce a conclusion that the court could have already reached through
other means; at worst, it can mislead the factfinder into reaching an erroneous
47. See, e.g., Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879 ("[H]earsay made up the majority, if not all, of
the evidence on which the district court relied . . .").
48. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994) ("The hearsay rule. .. is
premised on the theory that out-of-court statements are subject to particular ha-
zards. The declarant might be lying; he might have misperceived the events which
he relates; he might have faulty memory; his words might be misunderstood or
taken out of context by the listener. And the ways in which these dangers are mi-
nimized for in-court statements-the oath, the witness' awareness of the gravity
of the proceedings, the jury's ability to observe the witness' demeanor, and, most
importantly, the right of the opponent to cross-examine-are generally absent for
things said out of court."); GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 364 (2d ed. 2008) (stating
that direct testimony gives the opposing lawyer an opportunity to probe "for defi-
ciencies in perception, memory, narration, and sincerity"); Laurence H. Tribe,
Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958 (1974).
49. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at
880.
50. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 662 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 2009) ("To the extent that
the information within the statement mirrors the corroborating evidence, its ad-
mission into the record would be redundant, and to the extent it differs from the
corroborating evidence, it is no longer corroborated and therefore has no external
indicia of reliability."). This is especially true with regard to an interrogation re-
port where an error in translation or transcription can result in small but essential
pieces of information being misreported, such as dates and names. These con-
cerns are more than theoretical. In Al Odah v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2009), the government argued that its own evidence was unreliable, "that
interrogators and/or interpreters included incorrect dates in three separate reports
that were submitted into evidence based on misunderstandings between the Gre-
gorian and the Hijri calendars." Id. at 6.
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conclusion. Judges may also overestimate their ability to disregard unreliable
evidence, a result that counsels caution.51
Finally, the admission of all hearsay overlooks one of the most important
reasons for creating hearsay rules in the first place: their ability to increase in-
centives to gather reliable evidence, improve pretrial evidentiary procedures,
and deter the generation of frivolous or misleading evidence.5 ' Limitations on
hearsay deter litigants from generating and introducing large volumes of
low-quality evidence by requiring that all evidence meet an objective thre-
shold." Indeed, without hearsay restraints, the government has flooded the dis-
trict courts with thousands of documents and hundreds of exhibits, many of
which would have otherwise been inadmissible.5 4 For example, the record in
Kandari v. United States5 was voluminous. The parties "introduced approx-
imately 230 exhibits into the record, consisting of Al Kandari's own statements
as well as the statements of numerous third-party sources and other docu-
ments."5' But Kandari is hardly unique.5 1 Since detainees cannot hope to match
51. Schauer, supra note 23, at 189-92.
52. See id. at 196 ("By excluding hearsay... the hearsay rule compels the parties to
search for more rather than less direct accounts, and to locate and bring forward
the most immediate and cross-examinable witnesses.").
53. For example, in the absence of a bar on hearsay, one might gather numerous
second-hand accounts, lending the impression that many independent sources
corroborate a particular version of events, even though every second-hand ac-
count is actually derived from the same potentially unreliable source.
54. The government's ability to generate a limitless amount of evidence poses another
vexing problem for the courts because it allows the government to frame the
background facts against which the litigation takes place to an unusually extensive
degree. This advantage in laying what is called a "foundation"-the background
facts against which evidentiary relevancy is judged, see David S. Schwartz, A Foun-
dation Theory of Evidence, ioo GEO. L.J. 95, 122-23 (2011)-is a particularly signifi-
cant source of potential prejudice in these proceedings. Even in criminal proceed-
ings, in which the imbalance of power is perhaps most extreme in the American
system, judges still can rely on their own extensive knowledge and experience to
independently adjudge and evaluate the relevance of the evidence presented. But
the Afghanistan of early fall 2001 is an alien landscape for which judges have no
independent compass. They are left to rely on thousands of pages of government
evidence to understand the unique culture, geography, and politics of the region
in which a detainee was captured. Yet these formulations can be self-serving, and
their refutation nearly impossible for an individual petitioner to provide.
55. 744 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2010).
56. Id. at 23.
57. See, e.g., Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("[T]he government's
factual return in the habeas hearing ran to well over 400 pages."); Ahmed v. Oba-
ma, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53 (D.D.C. 2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191,
195 (D.D.C. 2008), rev'd, Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (2010) ("The Govern-
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the government's power to generate favorable evidence, allowing all hearsay in-
herently favors the government. This is bolstered by the dozens of cases that
have turned on "undisputed" government evidence, which has been used to es-
tablish, for example, that a detainee traveled known "al Qaeda route[s]"' or
wore accessories commonly worn by members of al-Qaeda, 9 to give only two
of dozens of examples.'o Given most petitioners' incarceration and limited
means, the evidence proffered by the government is functionally irrefutable.
Hearsay exclusion at least imposes minimal requirements that evidence by
which facts are proven be nominally reliable, even if the petitioner cannot af-
firmatively rebut it.
Hearsay itself raises intrinsic concerns about reliability and the risk of error.
The decision to admit all hearsay, even that hearsay most likely to mislead and
least likely to improve the accuracy of the factual inquiry, exacerbates this risk
without furthering the objective of reaching "actual truth." 6,
ment's return contained approximately 650 pages of exhibits and a 53-page narra-
tive . . . . Petitioners' traverse included approximately 1,650 pages of exhibits and
over 200 pages of narrative. . . .").
58. See Uthman v. Obama, 637 F-3d 400, 4o6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("[T]raveling to Afgha-
nistan along a distinctive path used by al Qaeda members can be probative evi-
dence that the traveler was part of al Qaeda.").
59. See, e.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
60. Undisputed evidence has also been used to establish that surrendering one's pass-
ports, identification, money, or other travel documents was "a standard operating
procedure" at guesthouses and training camps, Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F.
Supp. 2d 78, 89 (D.D.C. 2009); that al-Qaeda operatives are trained in counter-
interrogation tactics, Kandari, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 35; that Osama bin Laden was in
hiding in August of 2001, Al-Adahi, 613 F-3d at 1107; that individuals attending the
Al Farouq training camp received training on AK-47 rifles early in the program, Al
Odah v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2009); "that, as the Taliban
regime fell, Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters fled south en route to the Tora Bora
mountains along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border," Al Mutairi, 644 F. Supp. 2d at
89; and, that Al Farouq was evacuated shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks,
and that many of the individuals attending the camp were sent north to Kabul,
Jalalabad, and the Tora Bora mountains, Al Odah, 648 F. Supp. at 16.
61. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2oo).
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B. Accuracy and Authenticity"
Relying on language from Hamdi (and to a lesser extent Bournediene),63 the
government has continually sought a presumption of authenticity and accuracy
for its documentary evidence."1 The way the courts treat intelligence and inter-
rogation reports is particularly important because such reports are often the
backbone of the government's case in GuantAnamo habeas hearings.5 While
presuming the authenticity of such reports is not particularly problematic or
unusual, presuming their accuracy is. Often a detention hearing comes down to
the accuracy of an interrogation or intelligence report. If the report states that
the detainee admitted to some inculpatory fact, the accuracy of that report will
often mean the difference between detention and release. Government evidence
has repeatedly been shown to be unsourced, unverifiable, internally incoherent,
and even mistaken.66 Moreover, it is by its very nature almost wholly irrefuta-
ble. Nonetheless, in October 20ii-in a divided panel decision-the D.C. Cir-
cuit ruled that "official government documents" will from now on be presumed
to be both authentic and accurate."
The initial Case Management Order adopted by the district courts gave
judges the discretion to grant a presumption of authenticity and accuracy to the
government if it was "necessary to alleviate an undue burden presented by the
62. Presumptions of accuracy and authenticity, though often raised together, are dis-
tinct in important ways. Authenticity governs basic questions about a document
itself, e.g., "Is it actually an intelligence report?" This question has nothing to do
with the weight the factfinder ought to ascribe to it, but rather relates simply to
the question of whether it should be admissible at all. Accuracy, on the other
hand, speaks to what weight should attach to a particular item of admitted evi-
dence. To presume the accuracy of evidence is to presume the evidence establishes
that which it is offered to prove. Rather than answering the question, "Is this an
intelligence report?," a presumption of accuracy assumes that the account of the
detainee's statements in the intelligence report is in fact an accurate rendition of
what the detainee actually said.
63. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (20o8) ("Certain accommodations can be
made to reduce the burden habeas corpus proceedings will place on the military
without impermissibly diluting the protections of the writ."); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004) ("[E]nemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to
alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing
military conflict.... [For example,] the Constitution would not be offended by a
presumption in favor of the government's evidence, so long as that presumption
remained a rebuttable one and a fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided.").
64. Wittes et al., supra note ii, at 49.
65. See, e.g., Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 880; Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 847-49 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
66. Latif v. Obama, 666 F-3d 746, 774-75 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 751, 751 n.2, 755 (majority opinion).
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particular habeas corpus proceeding."" Since then, the government has asked
for a presumption of accuracy and authenticity in almost every case.9 It is diffi-
cult to find fault with a presumption of authenticity in these cases, as the gov-
ernment has generally proffered evidence that would have been admissible an-
yway under the Federal Rules of Evidence.70 Therefore, government requests for
a presumption of authenticity are almost uniformly granted.'
The D.C. Circuit did not grant the government's evidence a presumption of
accuracy, however, until Latif v. Obama in October 2011.72 Prior to Latif, the dis-
trict courts had refused to grant such a presumption, calling the government's
information unreliable because it often "resulted from harsh interrogation
techniques, multiple levels of hearsay, or unknown sources."'7 Government evi-
dence has repeatedly been shown to suffer from serious accuracy problems:
* In Ahmed v. Obama, the government admitted that two detainees
were given the same identification number, creating "confusion"
over which one was actually being referred to in the government's
intelligence report.74
* In Al Mutairi v. United States, the district judge noted that "the
Government believed for over three years that Al Mutairi manned
an anti-aircraft weapon in Afghanistan based on a typographical
error in an interrogation report."7
68. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442, 20o8 WL 4858241, at *3
(D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2oo8) ("The Merits Judge may accord a rebuttable presumption
of accuracy and authenticity to any evidence the government presents as justifica-
tion for the petitioner's detention if the government establishes that the presump-
tion is necessary to alleviate an undue burden presented by the particular habeas
corpus proceeding.").
69. See, e.g., Notice of Filing of Motion to Admit Hearsay Evidence with a Presump-
tion of Accuracy and Authenticity at 1, Al-Zarnouqi v. Obama, No. 06-01767, 2012
WL 5296112 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2012). Substantively identical motions were made
in Alsabri v. Obama, 764 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 20U), affd, 684 F-3d 1298 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) and Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009), vacated, Hatim v.
Gates, 632 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
70. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing FED. R.
EvID. 803(6)).
71. See, e.g., Alsabri, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 66 ("The court held that although the govern-
ment's evidence would, in appropriate circumstances, be afforded a presumption
of authenticity, it was not entitled to a presumption of accuracy.").
72. 666 F.3d at 752.
73. Id. at 751.
74. 613 F. Supp. 2d at 61-62.
75. 644 F. Supp. 2d 78, 84 (D.D.C. 2009).
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* In Al Rabiah v. United States, the district judge found that "the
record contains two reports written about the same interrogation"
with discrepancies the government "did not address" or attempt
"to reconcile."76
* In Al Odah v. United States, the government admitted "that inter-
rogators and/or interpreters included incorrect dates in three sepa-
rate reports that were submitted into evidence based on misun-
derstandings between the Gregorian and the Hijri calendars.""
Nonetheless, in Latif Judge Brown held that the presumption of accuracy is
founded "on inter-branch and inter-governmental comity," reasoning that
"[b]oth the Constitution and common sense support judicial modesty when
assessing the executive's authority to detain prisoners during wartime, for it is
an area in which the judiciary has the least competence and the smallest consti-
tutional footprint."7' At its core, Judge Brown's argument is that an executive
branch already trusted to effectively prosecute a war overseas under conditions
of extreme uncertainty and risk should be an executive branch the courts trust
to turn over accurate evidence.
But Judge Brown's emphasis on comity and deference is misplaced. First, it
seems to flatly contradict the very rationale underlying Boumediene: that the ju-
diciary should subject executive detention to judicial scrutiny. Second, deciding
disputed questions of fact is the quintessential judicial function; it is hard to
think of a task for which the judiciary is more competent. Indeed, in Latif itself,
the District Court found, after carefully weighing the evidence, the govern-
ment's report unreliable. 9 Therefore, the effect of the presumption in Latif was
to require a judge to presume the accuracy of a piece of evidence he had already
concluded was inaccurate.so
A presumption of accuracy also tips the balance in favor of the government
in disputes over questions of fact that hinge on documentary precision. In a
pre-Latif case, the petitioner, Al-Nahdi, argued that there were mistranslations
at the Administrative Review Board proceeding. Al-Nahdi argued the proceed-
ings made it appear that his voluntary departure from the Al Farouq training
camp was the "result of orders handed down by al-Qaida leadership.""1 Since
76. 658 F. Supp. 2d n, 18 (D.D.C. 2009).
77. 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2009).
78. 666 F-3 d at 752.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 770-71 ("[Tlhe court undertakes a wholesale revision of the district
court's careful fact findings.").
81. Al-Adahi v. Obama, 692 F. Supp. 2d 85, 99 (D.D.C. 2010).
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following orders from al-Qaeda is grounds for detention," Al-Nahdi unders-
tandably had reason to dispute the report's accuracy. But the court rejected Al-
Nahdi's arguments on the grounds that they were "self-serving," "rest[ed] on
pure speculation," and were supported by "no facts.""
But all of the reasons given by the Court of Appeals for rejecting AI-Nahdi's
arguments would seem to apply to any attempt, by any detainee, to rebut a gov-
ernment intelligence or interrogation report. Since very few detainees are likely
to be able to gather any extrinsic evidence to corroborate their exculpatory as-
sertions, any dispute over the accuracy of such a report is destined to look like a
"self-serving," "speculati[ve]," and unsupported attempt to retract a statement
against interest or undercut adverse testimony.4 Indeed, given how prejudicial
an admission of guilt is-by definition-it would seem all but impossible for a
detainee to rebut it once it is presumed accurate. The functional irrefutability of
government reports and records is particularly important because the govern-
ment's cases ordinarily hinge on them."
The presumption of accuracy stands to impact the substantive evidentiary
standard so disproportionately that Latif drew the first dissent issued by a judge
on the D.C. Circuit in the post-Boumediene habeas context. At least one defend-
er of the D.C. Circuit's work in crafting the procedural and evidentiary rules has
argued that the Court of Appeals' decisions have "been impressively unanim-
ous" and that "[tihis unanimity gave an impressively institutional flavor to the
court's work."86 But even this defender readily admitted that Latif"end[ed] that
streak with a bang.""
Judge David S. Tatel's forty-five page dissent in Latif was the first open ac-
knowledgment by a judge on the D.C. Circuit that the rules of evidence have a
significant impact on the substantive evidentiary standard," that many of the
82. Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("To be sure, demonstrating
that someone is part of al Qaeda's command structure is sufficient to show that
person is part of al Qaeda.").
83. Al-Adahi, 692 F. Supp. 2d at 99.
84. Id.; see, e.g., Sliti v. Bush, 592 F. Supp. 2d 46, 50 (D.D.C. 2008) ("Petitioner Sliti,
not surprisingly, disagrees with these various allegations."); Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F.
Supp. 2d 24, 28 (D.D.C. 20o8), afj'd, Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d ii (D.C. Cir. 2011)("Petitioner, not surprisingly, disagrees.").
85. See, e.g., Latif, 666 F.3d at 777.
86. Benjamin Wittes, Thoughts on Latif #5-Of En Bancs and Cert Grants, LAWFARE
(Nov. 13, 2011, 12:19 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/11/thoughts-on-latif-5
-of-en-bancs-and-cert-grants.
87. Id.
88. 666 F.3d at 784-87 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (explaining the ways in which evidentiary
rules impact the substantive evidentiary standard and questioning several of the
D.C. Circuit's settled evidentiary presumptions and approaches).
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evidentiary rules could not be justified as actually showing that a detainee was
more likely to be detainable than not,' and that the presumption in Latif was
so overwhelmingly favorable to the government that it entirely eviscerated
Boumediene's judicial check.90 As Judge Tatel concluded, the D.C. Circuit's new
rule presuming all government evidence is accurate "comes perilously close to
suggesting that whatever the government says must be treated as true."'
C. Why the Elimination ofAll Hearsay and Corroboration Requirements
Weakens Boumediene
In their inherent likelihood for error, their interaction with other eviden-
tiary rules, and their effective irrefutability, the D.C. Circuit's admissibility rules
significantly reduce the evidentiary standard necessary to prove the lawfulness
of detention-so much so that it is difficult to argue that they continue to grant
detainees a "meaningful opportunity" to contest the factual basis of their deten-
tion.9 ' There are at least four reasons why both hearsay's admissibility and a
record's accuracy should be independently assessed and tested.
First, and most importantly, excluding hearsay and requiring that records
be corroborated are both rules by their very nature designed to enhance the ac-
curacy of the underlying factual inquiry. This is no less true when judges are
factfinders. Judges and jurors alike are likely to overestimate their ability to dis-
count evidence from unreliable sources. 93 And few judges will ever face trials so
89. Id.
90. Id. at 779 ("But the court's assault on Bounediene does not end with its presump-
tion of regularity. Not content with moving the goal posts, the court calls the
game in the government's favor.").
91. Id. (quoting Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 849 (D.C. Cir. 20o8)).
92. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008).
93. See Schauer, supra note 23, at 190 ("[P]rofessionals typically overestimate the
power of their own professional skills, the reliability of their own judgments, and
the strength of their ability to assess a particular situation. If we can extrapolate
from this and related research, we might have reason to believe that judges will
typically overestimate their own ability to assess facts, their capacity to rise above
the cognitive failings of lesser mortals, and thus their own lack of need for the
kinds of exclusions (or, in theory, inclusions or weight-increasers) that are
represented by many of the rules of evidence."); Barbara A. Spellman, On the
Supposed Expertise of Judges in Evaluating Evidence, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNum-
BRA 1, 9 (2007) ("In the various lists comparing and contrasting the strengths and
weakness of judges, jurors, and juries, one important factor is often forgotten: all
are human. From earliest infancy, the human cognitive system is a sophisticated
tool for detecting patterns, seeing relations, imagining causes, and creating cohe-
rent stories (even if sometimes they do not exist).. .. It is difficult to envision how
a mere desire, or an admonition, to stop thinking like a human being could be ef-
fective.").
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inundated with potentially unreliable and uncorroborable evidence. This prob-
lem with lowering the admissibility requirements is compounded by the virtual
impossibility of accurately assessing the credibility of much of the uncorrobo-
rated, ordinarily excluded evidence that the government seeks to use to prove
detainability. It is quite simply impossible for anyone to independently assess
the credibility of an intelligence or interrogation report from an unknown
source.94 When such documents are admitted into evidence, they seem more
likely to mislead and distract the factfinder than to enhance the accuracy of his
or her conclusion.9 5 Thus, to the extent that unreliable uncorroborated evi-
dence is considered because of the lack of admissibility rules, it lowers the evi-
dentiary standard and elevates the risk that irrelevant evidence will be given un-
due weight.
Second, the removal of any threat that evidence will be excluded creates the
wrong incentives. Because nothing can be excluded, the evidentiary rules en-
courage the generation of overwhelming volumes of government evidence even
if the evidence is inaccurate and imbued with a strong tendency to mislead. Af-
ter all, as long as it remains possible that the judge might find a stray article of
evidence relevant, there is little reason not to introduce it into the record-
especially if that sliver of evidence cannot be rebutted. Indeed, second- and
third-hand hearsay have formed an integral component of the analysis in some
of the D.C. Circuit's most important cases.96 Rather than encourage the careful
gathering, preservation, and presentation of evidence, removing all barriers to
admissibility encourages the government to generate large amounts of evidence,
much of it of low quality.97
Third, both of the previously mentioned concerns are amplified by the D.C.
Circuit's use of mosaic analysis-discussed in Part II-which calls upon judges
to consider the credibility and probity of each individual piece of evidence in
the context of the record as a whole. Because the record can be inundated with a
94. See Latif, 666 F.3d at 777 (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("[I]nterrogation summaries and
intelligence reports on which [the Government] relfies] are not necessarily accu-
rate and, perhaps more importantly, that any inaccuracies are usually impossible
to detect." (quoting Odah v. Obama, No. o6-cv-i668, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. May 6,
2010))). This fact was also acknowledged in Parhat, 532 F.3d at 848-50.
95. Cf. FED. R. EvID. 403.
96. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. o5-28o(GK), 2009 WL 2584685, at *15 (D.D.C. Aug.
21, 2009) ("[Tlhe Government appears to pin its associational evidence that Peti-
tioner was captured while traveling in the company of Taliban fighters on a
statement made by AI-Adahi that '[a]fter his capture, [he] heard that there were
members of the Taliban on the bus."').
97. See Latif, 666 F.3d at 773 (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("To be sure, the government in
this case has produced a declaration stating [redacted] .... But we have no idea
what the [redacted] is, nor anywhere near the level of familiarity or experience
with that course of business that would allow us to comfortably make presump-
tions about whether the output of that process is reliable.").
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large amount of evidence of slight credibility, mosaic analysis combined with
the admissibility rules can lead different factfinders to draw vastly different con-
clusions about the same evidence.
Fourth, all of these issues are compounded by the D.C. Circuit's system of
appellate review.' Appellate review of district court habeas decisions blurs the
line between reexamining evidentiary credibility and reexamining sufficiency.99
The Court of Appeals reviews court conclusions about the probity of the evi-
dence in the record de novo, but must not overturn a district court's determi-
nation of evidentiary credibility except in cases of clear error.' Yet, when the
Court of Appeals reviews a District Court decision, it has no way of knowing
whether otherwise highly probative evidence was ignored because it simply was
not credible or because the district court judge failed to weigh its probity prop-
erly. Thus, the Court of Appeals has criticized district court decisions for "not
addressing" highly probative evidence that, when closely examined, was deter-
mined by the district court not to be credible.o' This fuzzy appellate review
can-and has-led the Court of Appeals to treat as entirely true items of evi-
dence that the District Court thought to be almost completely unconvincing.'o2
98. Id. at 770-71, 779-80 (arguing that the court in Latifbootstrapped a pretended dis-
trict court failure to properly weigh the evidence in the whole record as an excuse
to review the District Court's findings of evidentiary credibility for individual
items of evidence de novo).
99. See infra Part II.
1oo. Esmail v. Obama, 639 F-3d 1075, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that for "habeas ap-
peals involving Guantinamo Bay detainees, we review district court fact findings
for clear error, and we review the ultimate issue of whether the detainee was 'part
of al Qaeda de novo" (emphasis removed) (citing Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d
416, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2010))). Functionally, this means that the Court of Appeals re-
views the record as a whole de novo because "[d]etermining whether a detainee
was 'part of an associated force is a mixed question of law and fact." Barhoumi,
609 F.3d at 423.
101. Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, n1o6 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("That Al-Adahi was an
al-Qaida recruit is also supported by a witness's statement-not addressed by the
district court-that Al-Adahi was a [redacted]."); see id. at 1107 ("Al-Adahi's story
was contradicted by the undisputed evidence that in 2001 Usama bin Laden, who
knew he was a military target of the United States, had gone into hiding under
tight security . . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 11o8 ("The district
court seemed to think it important to determine Al-Adahi's motive for attending
the al-Qaida training camp: We do not understand why.").
102. Compare, e.g., Abdah v. Obama, 708 F. Supp. 2d 9, 21 (D.D.C. 2010) ("The allega-
tion that Uthman was an amir at an Al Qaeda guesthouse is not as easily dis-
missed as the training camp allegation. Because Belmar's statement is not a defini-
tive identification, it is not strong evidence of Uthman's presence at such a
guesthouse. But it is not so unreliable that the Court disregards it entirely."), with
Uthman v. Obama, 637 F-3d 400, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2011), rev'g Abdah, 708 F. Supp.
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These four complications with eliminating hearsay and corroboration re-
quirements each contribute to a sense that detainees do not receive the "mea-
ningful opportunity" to contest their detention that Boumediene promised.
Moreover, reintroducing basic hearsay and corroboration requirements would
seem to improve the accuracy of the fact-finding process, and create better in-
centives to introduce higher-quality evidence while drawing a clear line between
appellate review of district court decisions that exclude evidence because it is
"not credible" rather than "not probative." Finally, and most importantly, it
seems almost certain that the Boumediene Court did not anticipate that the D.C.
Circuit would eliminate all such hearsay and corroboration limitations. The
Supreme Court had conceived of "meaningful review" as providing a substan-
tially more protective evidentiary framework than has actually been devel-
oped.'03 To comply with Boumediene, the evidentiary rules should reintroduce
rudimentary hearsay and corroboration requirements, and thereby categorically
exclude those kinds of evidence most likely to mislead.
II. MOSAIc THEORY
Mosaic theory is the name given by courts, scholars, and commentators to
the D.C. Circuit's unique approach to judging evidence in post-Boumediene ha-
beas cases, a process that involves piecing together evidence from a variety of
disparate sources of varying credibility and probity to, paradoxically, determine
the credibility and probity of those very pieces of evidence.10 4 In combination
2d 9 ("[O1nce he reached Afghanistan, Uthman was seen at an al Qaeda guest-
house.").
103. See Vladeck, supra note 15, at 1467 ("If anything, a closer read of Boumediene sug-
gests that . .. the Guantgnamo detainees should receive more process than those
who seek to use habeas collaterally to attack state-court convictions since their de-
tention does not result from convictions obtained in a court of record, in which
'considerable deference is owed to the court that ordered confinement."' (empha-
sis removed) (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 782 (2oo8))).
104. Vladeck, supra note 15, at 1472. Mosaic analysis arises from the D.C. Circuit's ad-
monition to the District Court that it should not "weigh each piece of evidence in
isolation, but consider all of the evidence taken as a whole." Awad v. Obama, 608
F.3d at 6-7, 1o; see also Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 422-24; Odah v. United States, 611
F.3d 8, 13-15 (D.C. Cir. 2010). This method of judging evidence differs in signifi-
cant and important respects from the ordinary process of assessing evidentiary
credibility and probity; it can transform a piece of evidence that is not reliable on
its own into reliable evidence by virtue of how it fits together with other pieces of
evidence. See Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105-o6 ("The government is right: the district
court wrongly required each piece of the government's evidence to bear weight
without regard to all (or indeed any) other evidence in the case." (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); cf Wittes et al., supra note n1, at 109 ("[Al-Adahi's] key con-
tribution was in changing the nature of the evidentiary approach in general, by in-
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with the D.C. Circuit's lax admissibility rules, mosaic analysis can lead to signif-
icant mistakes in judging evidence.
In some ways, mosaic analysis seems intuitive and obvious. An individual
piece of evidence is only a single tile: whether it points toward or away from de-
tention depends in some sense on what the other tiles in the mosaic look like.
But mosaic analysis actually differs significantly from ordinary evidentiary
weighing because it allows one item of evidence to bolster the credibility of
another item, an approach that carries with it significant dangers.o5 Mosaic
analysis creates the possibility that two pieces of unreliable evidence might false-
ly corroborate each other."o' In combination with the D.C. Circuit's lax admis-
sibility rules-which often result in the introduction of evidence deserving little
or no weight-mosaic analysis can lead courts to deny habeas petitions solely
on evidence of which no individual item is individually credible.
For these reasons, the theory has been called "wildly exploitable"'o and
prone to misuse."'os Because so many different plausible mosaics can be con-
structed out of the same tiles, the theory invites manipulation and inconsistent
application.' Given these concerns with consistency and reliability, the fact
sisting that courts should view each allegation in the context of the other proba-
tive evidence on record.").
105. This is because human beings often improperly weigh endogeneity and base-rate
information in making conclusions based on conditional probability. See, e.g.,
Maya Bar-Hillel, The Base-Rate Fallacy in Probability Judgments, 44 ACTA Psv-
CHOLOGICA 211, 211-33 (1980); Robert M. Hamm & Michelle A. Miller, Interpreta-
tion of Conditional Probabilities in Probabilistic Inference Word Problems, 1983
INST. COGNITIVE ScI. 1-7, 13-26, http://ics.colorado.edu/techpubs/pdf/88-15.pdf;
Robert M. Hamm, People Misinterpret Conditional Probabilities, U.S. ARMY RES.
INST. FOR THE BEHAV. & Soc. Sci. 1-16 (Jan. 1995), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi
-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA293527.
106. Indeed, as Judge Walton aptly noted, a rumor is only as reliable as its source-no
matter how many people testify to having heard it. Bostan v. Obama, 662 F. Supp.
2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2009) ("Ultimately, the government seems to suggest that because
so much of its hearsay evidence is (in its view) internally consistent, the contents
of all of its proffered hearsay evidence must be true, rather in the same way that a
rumor must be true if enough people repeat it. But even the most widespread ru-
mors are often inaccurate in part if not in whole. How, then, is the Court to know
which parts are correct and which are not? It does not and will never know, which
is why it cannot assess the reliability of hearsay on the basis of other unreliable
hearsay that purportedly corroborates it.").
107. David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 675 (2005).
1o8. Id. at 679.
109. This is evidenced by the fact that the Court of Appeals and the District Court has
disagreed in six of the fourteen cases in which the method has been reviewed by
both the District Court and the Court of Appeals. See Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746
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that the D.C. Circuit reviews the District Court's applications of the mosaic
theory de novo raises additional concerns. By wading so deeply into the district
courts' factfinding, the Court of Appeals effectively grants the government a
second chance.
A. Development of the Mosaic Theory
Soon after Boumediene, the government began arguing for the application
of an early version of mosaic theory. The government requested that judges
synthesize snippets of statements by the habeas petitioner and other detainees
drawn from multiple interrogations along with intelligence reports on al-Qaeda
and the region."o Without explicitly adopting or rejecting the government's
theory, but faced with the daunting task of piecing together hundreds of dis-
crete pieces of often unrelated, marginally reliable evidence, the district judges
proceeded through the inquiry with caution. As Judge Richard J. Leon noted in
el Gharani v. Bush, a mosaic of tiles bearing murky images "reveals nothing"
with clarity."'
While the Court of Appeals advised the lower court to view the record as a
whole as early as Awad v. Obama,"' the delineation of the Court of Appeals'
mosaic standard came in 2010 in Al-Adahi v. Obama"-the first case in which
the Court of Appeals reversed a district court's grant of habeas corpus. After Al-
Adahi, an unduly "atomized" view of the record would be subject to reversal de
novo, without the traditional deference afforded to lower court evidentiary de-
terminations. 114
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Uthman v. Ob-
ama, 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Hatim v. Gates, 632 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(per curiam); Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010); AI-Adahi, 613 F-3d
1102.
no. See, e.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. CIV.A 05-280(GK), 2009 WL 2584685 (D.D.C.
Aug. 21, 2009); Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2009); el Gharani
v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144, 148 (D.D.C. 2009).
inl. el Gharani, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 149.
112. Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 6-7, 1o (D.C. Cir. 2010).
113. Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1104-o6 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
114. See Latif, 666 F-3 d at 759-60; see also Wittes et al., supra note 11, at 112 ("The law
that is emerging from the D.C. Circuit's reaction is highly favorable to the gov-
ernment's position and represents a dramatic change in the landscape over a rela-
tively short period of time.... [T]he government can be expected to prevail under
the D.C. Circuit's standards far more frequently than it would have had the dis-
trict court's approach remained intact").
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B. Mosaic Theory in Practice
Since Al-Adahi, it has become clear that the mosaic theory does not merely
call for district courts to consider circumstantial evidence. District courts have
repeatedly clashed with the Court of Appeals over just how much evidence
must be credited in making a detention determination. In Al-Adahi,"I Uth-
man,"' Almerfedi,"' and Latif"8 the Court of Appeals reversed grants of habeas
relief either in whole or in part because the District Court considered the evi-
dence in an "unduly atomized" manner."9
The language of the Court of Appeals, both in Al-Adahi and in the cases
following it, makes it seem as if this dispute between the courts is merely a mat-
ter of competence. In Al-Adahi, Judge Randolph characterized the District
Court's errors as "'mundane mistakes"' traceable to a 'shaky grasp of the no-
tion of conditional probability.""2 0 In Uthman, Judge Kavanaugh continued
this approach, making it seem as if the district court that granted Uthman's ha-
beas petition had committed gross errors in weighing the evidence:
Uthman's account piles coincidence upon coincidence upon coinci-
dence. Here, as with the liable or guilty party in any civil or criminal
case, it remains possible that Uthman was innocently going about his
business and just happened to show up in a variety of extraordinary
places-a kind of Forrest Gump in the war against al Qaeda. But Uth-
man's account at best strains credulity; and the far more likely explana-
tion for the plethora of damning circumstantial evidence is that he was
part of al Qaeda."'
The Court of Appeals' rhetoric makes it sound as if the District Court judges
failed to realize that in terms of the weight of the evidence, Uthman and Al-
Adahi "were not close." 22
But this account is implausible. The district court judges are sophisticated
factfinders who understand how to weigh circumstantial evidence.2 3 And this is
115. 613 F.3d at 102.
116. Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 407 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
117. Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F-3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
118. 666 F-3d at 747.
119. Id. at 759.
120. 613 F. 3d at n1o5 (quoting JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL
ILLITERACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 63 (1988)).
121. Uthman, 637 F.3d at 407.
122. Almerfedi, 654 F-3d at 4 (citing Al-Adahi and Uthman as cases in which the evi-
dence was not even "close" to disestablishing the lawfulness of detention).
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not a case in which a small contingent of maverick judges are flouting the law of
the D.C. Circuit-five different district judges'2 4 have been reversed for failing
to properly apply mosaic analysis. In addition, the D.C. Circuit has not affirmed
a single district court grant of habeas relief-reversing or vacating six such deci-
sions."' This remarkable record seems to indicate a discrepancy that cannot be
explained away by the Court of Appeals' claim of error by the district courts.
The substance of the decisions reveals at least three phenomena. First, be-
cause of the mosaic theory's requirement that judges take into account the "evi-
dence in the whole record""'-a record that, under Al-Bihani,2 7 includes much
explicitly unreliable evidence-even faithful application of mosaic review is
likely to lead to different conclusions when considered by different judges."'
Second, the Court of Appeals has been choosing tiles and telling the District
Court that those tiles are to be treated as especially probative even when they ac-
tually are not especially probative."'9 Third, in conducting mosaic review, the
123. The average number of years of experience of the district court judges reversed in
these cases is seventeen. Four received their commissions in 1994, while Judge
Henry M. Kennedy, Jr. began his service in 1997.
124. Judge Henry H. Kennedy, Jr., Judge Gladys Kessler, Judge Paul L. Friedman,
Judge James Robertson, and Judge Ricardo M. Urbina.
125. Abdah v. Obama, 708 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2010) (Henry H. Kennedy, Jr.); Ab-
dah v. Obama, No. CIV.A 04-1254 (HHK), 2010 WL 3270761 (D.D.C. Aug. 16,
2010) (Henry H. Kennedy, Jr.); Almerfedi v. Obama, 725 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C.
2010), rev'd, 654 F-3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Paul L. Friedman); Salahi v. Obama, 710 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (James Robertson), vacated by 625 F-3d 745 (D.C. Cir.
2010); Al-Adahi v. Obama, CIV.A 05-280(GK), 2009 WL 2584685 (D.D.C. Aug. 21,
2009) (Gladys Kessler); Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d i (D.D.C. 2009) (Ricar-
do M. Urbina), vacated, sub nom. Hatim v. Gates, 632 F-3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
126. Almerfedi, 654 F.3d at 5 ("On review, we ask whether the evidence in the whole
record-taking into account the premise that two unreliable pieces of informa-
tion may corroborate each other-establishes that a petitioner's detainability is
more likely justified than not (under de novo review). As we noted, the court is
never called upon to decide whether a petitioner definitively meets the detention
standard-instead, it merely makes a comparative judgment about the evidence."
(citation omitted)).
127. See id.
128. Cf. Wittes et al., supra note II, at 120 (noting that the Court of Appeals' decisions
seem to indicate that "it is insufficient for a district judge to merely say that he is
considering the mosaic as a whole, when in reality he is not truly doing so").
129. For an especially thoughtful rebuke of the D.C. Circuit Court's insistence that dis-
trict judges give great weight to whether detainees traveled "known" al-Qaeda
routes, see Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Tatel, J., dissenting)
("[Tihe government argues that because Latif's admitted route is consistent with
that of Taliban soldiers [redacted] it is a helpful piece in the puzzle, bolstering its
claim that the Report's [redacted] are accurate. Fair enough, but how helpful? If
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Court of Appeals has repeatedly and readily credited evidence that was deemed
unreliable by the District Court, upsetting the District Court's careful balanc-
ing.
Al-Adahi itself illustrates well the dangers of mosaic analysis. In the course
of reconstructing the evidentiary mosaic, Judge Randolph ignored the careful
balancing of credibility and probity undertaken by District Judge Kessler in the
original proceedings. In granting Al-Adahi's petition, Judge Kessler expressed
concern about the credibility of the government's meager evidence."o But Judge
Randolph characterized the same evidence quite differently. For each of the
facts in the record, Judge Randolph ignored Judge Kessler's decision not to cre-
dit the government's weak evidence and acted instead as if she had merely over-
looked it."' The only evidence that Al-Adahi was captured on a bus with Tali-
ban fighters was his own statements that he "heard" that there were Taliban
fighters from some unidentified source.'32 Judge Randolph concluded that Al-
this route is commonly used by innocent civilians, then the evidence is not that
helpful at all. To understand why, consider a simple hypothetical. Suppose the
government were to argue in a drug case that the defendant drove north from Mi-
ami along 1-95, 'a known drug route.' Familiar with 1-95, we would surely re-
spond that many thousands of non-drug traffickers take that route as well. Given
what we know about our own society, the 1-95 inference would be too weak even
to mention.").
130. Judge Kessler wrote, "[T)he Government appears to pin its associational evidence
that Petitioner was captured while traveling in the company of Taliban fighters on
a statement made by Al-Adahi that '[alfter his capture, [he] heard that there were
members of the Taliban on the bus."' Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. CIV.A 05-280
(GK), 2009 WL 2584685, at *15 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009). In regard to an injury to
his arm and leg that Al-Adahi said was due to a motorcycle accident, for example,
Judge Kessler wrote that "it is correct that some minor details in the motorcycle
story are not described identically in each interrogation" but "the Government
provides only speculation to resolve that doubt." Id. In another example, Judge
Kessler concluded that that the government tendered no evidence on al-Adahi's
travel routes, only "allegation [s]" that his path tracked major battles. Id. Sum-
ming up, Judge Kessler wrote, "[Al-Adahi's] conduct after training at Al Farouq
does not demonstrate that .. . [he] took any affirmative steps to align himself with
al-Qaida. The record shows that he returned to [his brother-in-law's] house for a
few weeks, attempted to flee Kandahar, injured himself and received treatment,
and then again made efforts to escape Afghanistan. Id.
131. This is contrary, however, to the general rule that "'when the district court
makes a finding of fact, it must be assumed that conflicting testimony was rejected
and that documents or parts thereof depending on the veracity of witnesses giving
such conflicting testimony were found to be unreliable, even if the trial judge did
not make a series of detailed statements to the effect that he or she did not credit
the testimony or part of the testimony of each witness." 2A Fed. Proc., L. Ed.
§ 3:812.
132. Judge Kessler also wrote in a footnote that "[i]n another recounting of his story"
in the Joint Evidence, Al-Adahi was arrested in a "large, modern city, with a large
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Adahi's statement should have been treated as conclusive evidence that he was
captured among Taliban fighters because it fit cleanly into the mosaic of evi-
dence that the government had presented showing Al-Adahi to be an al-Qaeda
fighter.
Uthman, one of a trio of cases following Al-Adahi where the D.C. Circuit
reversed a district court decision ostensibly on the basis of a misapplication of
mosaic review, is another example of the problems with mosaic analysis. In
Uthman, the District Court was aware that the Court of Appeals had directed it
to weigh some pieces of evidence more than others, but ultimately came to its
own conclusion about what weight to afford those tiles given the particular cir-
cumstances surrounding the detainee."' For example, although the Court of
Appeals had directed lower courts to treat attendance at a guesthouse as "over-
whelming" evidence of membership in al-Qaeda, the District Court refused to
treat the evidence as probative because other evidence in the record revealed
that it was common for young Muslim men to stay in guesthouses when travel-
ing for humanitarian missions in Afghanistan and elsewhere.3 4 The District
Court also seemed aware of the Court of Appeals' directive that lower courts
treat travel along routes used by al-Qaeda fighters as highly probative, but nev-
ertheless showed skepticism that such evidence actually was probative at all."'
In deciding the Uthman appeal, Judge Kavanaugh re-weighted the tiles of
the evidentiary mosaic, brought in some tiles that the District Court had expli-
citly chosen not to treat as credible, and fashioned a new mosaic to establish
that Uthman was a member of al-Qaeda. Using much of the same evidence as
the District Judge, for instance, Judge Kavanaugh determined that Uthman had
market area" several hours after departing the bus and he had "his passport with
him." Al-Adahi, 2009 WL 2584685, at *15 n.21. To quote Judge Kessler: "This in-
consistency simply cannot be resolved. The underlying fact of his arrest by the Pa-
kistani military, however, is not in dispute." Id.
133. On the question of whether Uthman actually appeared at guesthouses at all, the
evidence was clearly very close. Although the judge ultimately chose to "credit"
the evidence, the fact that the evidence was so close clearly influenced the degree
to which the court weighed the evidence in the final calculation. See Abdah v. Ob-
ama, 708 F. Supp. 2d 9, 21 (D.D.C. 2010) ("The allegation that Uthman was an
amir at an Al Qaeda guesthouse is not as easily dismissed as the training camp al-
legation. Because Belmar's statement is not a definitive identification, it is not
strong evidence of Uthman's presence at such a guesthouse. But it is not so unre-
liable that the Court disregards it entirely.").
134. Id. at 23 n.17 ("In addition, there is evidence in the record, albeit not specific to Al
Qaeda guesthouses, that '[t]he fact that a young Yemeni stays at 'guest houses'
while in ... Afghanistan does not itself imply anything menacing or illicit' because
it is common for such a man traveling abroad to seek economical, safe accommo-
dations.").
135. Id. at 22-23.
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lied to interrogators."' In an additional example in which the Court of Appeals'
assumptions diverged from the District Court, Judge Kavanaugh also noted that
Uthman was captured with two admitted or alleged al-Qaeda members. But
Judge Kavanaugh saves for a footnote that Uthman was captured in a group of
thirty men overall, whose detention status is passed over in silence."' Judge
Kavanaugh also chided the District Court for failing to respect Circuit
precedent holding that attendance at a guesthouse is "'powerful-indeed 'over-
whelming'-evidence' that an individual is part of al Qaeda"'as even though
that presumption was pulled from thin air by the court in Al-Bihani.'39 The di-
vergent treatment of the guesthouse evidence is especially difficult to under-
stand because the district court was skeptical that Uthman even attended any
guesthouses at all, 4o while Judge Kavanaugh acted as if Uthman's stay at a
guesthouse was a virtual certainty. 4'
Thus, the tiles in Uthman, adjudged and carefully weighed by the lower
court, were reshuffled and recalibrated in constructing a new account of Uth-
man's likely membership in al-Qaeda. Such difference in interpretation is not in
and of itself problematic. The true fault in mosaic theory is that it is "wildly ex-
ploitable,"1 42 and that so many different mosaics can be constructed such that it
is nearly impossible to determine which of many equally probable mosaics is
true.4 3 At times, the D.C. Circuit's brand of mosaic review can come across as
136. Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 4o6 (D.C. Cir. 2011)..It is not clear how or why
Judge Kavanaugh concluded that Uthman lied about the source, rather than
misspoke or misremembered, especially given that the District Court at no point
concluded that Uthman ever intentionally misled anyone. See infra Section III.C
(detailing further problems with the false exculpatory statement presumption).
137. See id. at 402 & n.i (D.C. Cir. 2011). The government apparently kept Uthman in
custody because it believed that he was a bodyguard for Osama bin Laden, a fact
that the District Court refused to concede. See Abdah, 708 F. Supp. at 14-19.
138. Uthman. 637 F.3d at 406.
139. See infra Section III.A.
140. Abdah, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 21. The District Court released two versions of Uthman,
with two vastly different presentations of "facts." A number of scholars have
commented on what is actually a "fact" in Uthman. See, e.g., Dafna Linzer, In
Gitmo Opinion, Two Versions of Reality, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 25, 2011),
http://www.propublica.org/article/in-gitmo-opinion-two-versions-of-reality
(contrasting the original opinion released by the District Court in Uthman with
an opinion released after the original was withdrawn for redaction, suggesting
that the government redacted portions of the opinion which highlighted the gov-
ernment's reliance on uncredible witnesses).
141. See, e.g., Uthman, 637 F.3d at 406 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("[O]nce he reached Afghanis-
tan, Uthman was seen at an al Qaeda guesthouse.").
142. Pozen, supra note 107, at 675.
143. Id. at 672.
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little more than a way of using paper-thin evidence to justify detention post
hoc, a result that can be damaging to the legitimacy of Boumediene review and
to America's prestige and credibility abroad.
C How Mosaic Theory Is Problematic
The risk of error that arises out of the mosaic theory's ability to rehabilitate
unreliable evidence is simple to explain.144 An individual item of evidence may
not be enough on its own to meet the preponderance standard. If a second item
of evidence on its own is also not enough to meet the preponderance standard,
mosaic theory holds that the two items of evidence taken together might never-
theless be more probative than either standing alone. While it is certainly possi-
ble that they do in fact corroborate each other, it is also likely that they are no
more probative together than each was individually.
This can be illustrated effectively by way of example. Imagine the govern-
ment seeks to introduce a statement against a habeas petitioner that another de-
tainee "overheard" conversations at Guantdnamo Bay about the petitioner's
travels in Afghanistan.145 This statement, unverifiable hearsay on its own, might
be insufficient to meet the preponderance standard. But what if a second detai-
nee testifies to the same effect but later recants, arguing that he implicated the
petitioner only because "he feared further torture?"** Mosaic analysis counsels
that both statements are more likely to be true because there are now two data
points, rather than one, pointing against the petitioner's release, and these two
data points corroborate each other.' 4 7
But there are multiple reasons to doubt that the reliability of either of these
statements is enhanced by the existence of the other. Perhaps none of the detai-
nees at Guantdnamo should be trusted when they inculpate other detainees be-
cause of the harsh interrogations to which they have been subjected. It is easy to
see that if the government were sufficiently persuasive in its questioning, it
could obtain statements from all of the detainees at Guantdnamo implicating
other detainees. Moreover, it could be the case that the detainee who testified
that he "overheard" conversations by other detainees merely overheard the oth-
er detainee whose testimony the government now seeks to enter into evidence
to corroborate his story. In that case, both statements reflect the sentiments of
the same witness and therefore do not enhance the evidence's reliability at all.
Ordinarily, when each individual item of evidence a party seeks to enter is
itself unreliable, that party is not permitted to corroborate it with other unrelia-
144. See Vladeck, supra note 15, at 1472 n.112.
145. The facts of this hypothetical are inspired by Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51,
57 (D.D.C. 2009).
146. Id. at 58.
147. See Vladeck, supra note 15, at 1472 n.112.
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ble evidence.4s But mosaic analysis alters the ordinary approach, requiring that
courts attempt to patch together unreliable evidence in such a way that individ-
ual pieces rehabilitate each other in forming a coherent whole. This elevates the
risk of error enormously, and would seem to be flatly inconsistent with the Cir-
cuit's stated fidelity to the preponderance standard.
The likelihood of error is further multiplied, however, by the D.C. Circuit's
use of de novo review to rectify perceived failures in applying the mosaic theory
properly. Generally, it is the trial court's task to resolve or interpret conflicting
or ambiguous testimony, judge credibility, and weigh evidence.149 The reasons
for the rule are threefold. First, district judges are in a better position to evaluate
the evidence than appellate judges because the former see the live testimony and
engage with the evidence in the context of the whole trial,' and because they
are experts at assessing and weighing evidence. Second, the costs, both to the
parties and to the courts, are thought to outweigh the benefits of having a
second proceeding that renders the first moot."' Third, in the context of a pro-
ceeding in which the government seeks a restraint of liberty, it is problematic to
grant the government a second bite at the apple to prove the guilt of the ac-
cused."' In addition, the government has the unfair advantage of using what it
learned in the first proceeding to perfect its strategy in the second.
Thus, in addition to importing mosaic theory's inherent complexity and
capacity to mislead, the D.C. Circuit's new evidence-intensive appellate review
multiplies the risk of erroneous detention both by calling on the appeals court
to judge evidentiary credibility outside the context of the trial, and by granting
the government a chance to hone its arguments and relitigate the case on ap-
peal.
To rectify the problems with mosaic analysis, the Court of Appeals should
reintroduce clear lines between assessing evidentiary credibility and evidentiary
probity. Evidence that is unreliable should not be permitted to rehabilitate oth-
er unreliable evidence but should be independently assessed. Functionally, this
will make it more difficult for the government to prove that detainees are de-
tainable-but only because it will return the evidentiary standard to preponder-
ance-of-the-evidence, the very standard that the Court of Appeals already pur-
ports to apply.
148. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 662 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 n.1 (D.D.C. 2009).
149. 2A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 3:812.
150. See Concrete Pipe & Prods of Calif., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S.
Calif., 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993).
151. See id.
152. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall any person be subject for the same of-
fence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . .").
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III. IRREFUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS
In the early habeas cases following Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit ap-
proached the legal determination of whether a particular detainee was an un-
lawful enemy combatant by holistically evaluating the evidence proffered by
each party for its "authenticity, reliability, and relevance."' But in the four
years since the Case Management Order's adoption, the Circuit has almost
wholly abandoned its practice of exercising this individualized inquiry.5 4 The
D.C. Circuit initially considered several factors that weighed heavily towards a
detainee meeting the standard of "unlawful enemy combatant."'55 That Court
has now articulated four evidentiary rules that operate as nearly irrefutable pre-
sumptions of membership in al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or its associated forces. The
Court of Appeals has held that visiting an al-Qaeda affiliated guesthouse or at-
tending an al-Qaeda affiliated training camp, being captured without a pass-
port, or providing a false exculpatory statement each provide sufficient grounds
for a court to conclude that a detainee was an unlawful enemy combatant.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals has indicated that this evidence of membership
cannot be rebutted by explanation or mitigating circumstances.
Given the number of habeas petitions that the Court of Appeals has heard,
one might chalk up these rules to judicial experience. Perhaps some facts have
come to be recognized as strongly associated with being an unlawful enemy
combatant. But the district courts-which have considered every habeas peti-
tion and from which the Case Management Order was developed-have re-
sisted the rules to varying degrees. While some District Court judges have dialed
back the irrefutable presumptions to mere factors to consider in their overarch-
153. See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2009).
154. One can, of course, argue that irrefutable presumptions are the inevitable product
of experience, and that they serve to reduce the cost and possibly the risk of error
in judicial factfinding. But for reasons explained earlier, the presumptions created
by the D.C. Circuit do not seem to be of this kind.
155. See Uthman v. Obama, 637 F-3d 400, 405 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("[T]raveling to Afgha-
nistan along a distinctive path used by al Qaeda members can be probative evi-
dence that the traveler was part of al Qaeda."). But see Abdah v. Obama, 708 F.
Supp. 2d 9, 22 (D.D.C. 2010) ("[Plroceeding on the same path as Al Qaeda mem-
bers is not evidence of participation in Al Qaeda.").
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ing evidentiary analysis,"' at least one judge has gone further and refused to ap-
ply the Court of Appeals "dicta" altogether."7
There are, however, three critical reasons why these irrefutable presump-
tions are unlikely to reflect judicial experience as much as a desire to give the
executive clear guidelines for the gathering of minimal evidence to support a
finding of lawful detention. First, an irrefutable presumption-by virtue of its
irrefutability-leaves the petitioner no "ability to rebut the factual basis for the
Government's assertion that he is an enemy combatant," a requirement Bou-
mediene imposed upon the habeas court."'8 The Court of Appeals has repeatedly
held that when evidence shows a petitioner to meet one of the four presump-
tions, he cannot explain the evidence away by showing that he was simply in the
wrong place at the wrong time.159 Second, presumptions can distort the under-
lying credibility inquiry by vastly raising the stakes of a finding that a detainee
did or did not engage in the presumptively detainable activity. When the evi-
dence that a detainee actually visited an al-Qaeda guesthouse is close, for exam-
ple, the gravitational pull of the presumption's binary effect may tempt judges
to find the evidence credible.160 Third, and most importantly, these presump-
tions are not nearly as probative of membership in al-Qaeda as their over-
whelming weight in these proceedings implies. Although these presumptions
156. See, e.g., Kandari v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 2d 11, 35 (D.D.C. 2010) ("Recent
D.C. Circuit precedent counsels that the provision by a detainee of an implausible
explanation for his activities in Afghanistan is a relevant consideration in these
habeas proceedings given the 'well-settled principle that false exculpatory state-
ments are evidence-often strong evidence-of guilt."' (quoting Al-Adahi v.
Obama, 613 F-3d 1102, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2010))).
157. Al Harbi v. Obama, No. CIV.A. 05-02479 (HHK), 2010 WL 2398883, at *16 n.41
(D.D.C. May 13, 2010) ("The Court has explained in its previous rulings on the
habeas petitions of other Guantanamo Bay detainees that this statement is dicta
and for other reasons should not necessarily control the outcome of these cas-
es.... Here, respondents have failed to show that Issa House was an Al Qaeda
guesthouse. The Court simply will not conclude that a one-night stay at Abu Zu-
baydah's house, where Mingazov was unable to communicate with most if not all
other occupants, from which he was sent away shortly after his arrival, and which
goes in no way to show that Mingazov was part of Al Qaeda's command structure,
meets the standard for lawful detention." (internal citations omitted)).
158. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 729 (2008).
159. See, e.g., Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (disregarding the
petitioner's claim, cited by the district court among other reasons for granting ha-
beas, that he traveled to Afghanistan "to teach the Koran"); Al-Adahi v. Obama,
613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (reversing the district court's determination that al-
though al-Adahi stayed at a guesthouse and visited a training camp, there was no
evidence that he acted as a trainer, fought for al-Qaeda, or provided any support
to al-Qaeda).
160. See, e.g., Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F-3d i (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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have now been found by the D.C. Circuit to be definitive on the question of
membership in al-Qaeda or the Taliban-and therefore on detainability-the
fact is that many people satisfying these criteria were not members of either of
these organizations.
A. Al-Qaeda Affiliated Guesthouse or Training Camp
The Court of Appeals introduced the first two irrefutable presumptions to-
gether in Al-Bihani v. Obama. Relying on the 9/11 Commission Report,'"' Judge
Brown noted that evidence showing the petitioner visited an al-Qaeda guest-
house or attended an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan "would seem to
overwhelmingly, if not definitively, justify the government's detention of such a
non-citizen.""' In Almerfedi v. Obama,'" Al-Madhwani v. Obama,16 4 Al-Adahi
v. Obama,'"I and Al-Bihani v. Obama,'66 the D.C. Circuit relied upon this rule
to either affirm the lower court's denial of habeas-in Al-Bihani and Al-
Madhwani-or to reverse the lower court's grant of habeas-in Al-Adahi and
Almerfedi. In total, the district courts relied upon this presumption in five sepa-
rate habeas petitions to deny relief."'
161. Judge Brown cites pages 66 and 67 from the Report to justify her rule. But the Re-
port is ambiguous at best.
The Taliban seemed to open the doors to all who wanted to come to Afg-
hanistan to train in the camps. The alliance with the Taliban provided al
Qaeda a sanctuary in which to train and indoctrinate fighters and terror-
ists, import weapons, forge ties with other jihad groups and leaders, and
plot and staff terrorist schemes. While Bin Ladin maintained his own al
Qaeda guesthouses and camps for vetting and training recruits, he also
provided support to and benefited from the broad infrastructure of such
facilities in Afghanistan made available to the global network of Islamist
movements. U.S. intelligence estimates put the total number of fighters
who underwent instruction in Bin Ladin-supported camps in Afghanis-
tan from 1996 through 9/11 at io,ooo to 20,000.
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 66-67 (2002).
162. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1814 (2on).
163. 654 F-3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
164. 642 F-3d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
165. 613 F-3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
166. 590 F.3d 866.
167. Hentif v. Obama, 81o F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2011); Hussein v. Obama, 821 F.
Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2011); Alsabri v. Obama, 764 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2011),
affd, 684 F-3d 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Kandari v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 2d ni
(D.D.C. 2010); Sulayman v. Obama, 729 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2010).
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The 9/11 Commission Report, however, does not make as strong a claim as
Judge Brown does. The Commission Report notes that "[wihile Bin Ladin
maintained his own al Qaeda guesthouses and camps for vetting and training
recruits, he also provided support to and benefited from the broad infrastructure
of such facilities in Afghanistan made available to the global network of Islamist
movements."' The Report itself thus acknowledges that there existed many
guesthouses, and even training camps, in Afghanistan that were not al-Qaeda
controlled. Yet these guesthouses and camps have been swept within the D.C.
Circuit's now-broad rule of "al Qaeda affiliated," since an al-Qaeda member
might have once visited it or sent it food supplies.'69
This incongruity between the actual probity of staying at a particular guest-
house and the legal presumption of detainability that arises from such a stay has
led to resistance among some of the district court judges. In Abdah v. Obama
and Al Harbi v. Obama, for example, District Judge Kennedy rejected the gov-
ernment's claim that "Issa House" is a bona fide al-Qaeda guesthouse. Instead,
he found that the "house was not a tightly controlled environment,"'o and that
"some, and possibly most, of the occupants of Issa House were not members of
Al Qaeda." 7' The question of what qualifies as a guesthouse has also led to con-
fusion. District Judge Friedman noted that the "government has not proven
that the word 'guesthouse' is a term of art such that its use would always imply
an al-Qaeda affiliation. This uncertainty about the use of the word 'guesthouse'
is all the greater given the significant complications caused by Arabic transla-
tion."' Further, guesthouses in Afghanistan and Pakistan are known sanctu-
aries for humanitarian volunteers.'73 The fact that Al-Adahi stayed at a guest-
house and visited a training camp because he thought that they were a
"gathering place for Muslims" 7 4 is not so far-fetched when one realizes that
Afghanistan was home to multiple guesthouses and training camps, and some
had nothing to do with al-Qaeda.
168. The 9/11 Commission Report 66-67 (emphasis added).
169. See, e.g., Abdah v. Obama, 717 F. Supp. 2d 21, 33 (D.D.C. 2010); Al Harbi v. Ob-
ama, No. CIV.A. 05-02479 (HHK), 2010 WL 2398883 (D.D.C. May 13, 2010).
170. Abdah v. Obama, 717 F. Supp. 2d 21, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
171. Al Harbi v. Obama, No. CIV.A. 05-02479 (HHK), 2010 WL 2398883, at *16
(D.D.C. May13, 2010).
172. Almerfedi v. Obama, 725 F. Supp. 2d 18, 23 (D.D.C. 2010), rev'd, 654 F-3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
173. Guesthouses are ubiquitous throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan. See Alissa J.
Rubin, Guesthouses Used by Foreigners in Kabul Hit by Deadly Attacks, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2010, http://nytimes.com/2o1o/o2/27/world/asia/27kabul.html.
174. Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F-3d 1102, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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In fact, prior to the establishment of these two rules, three detainees who
had visited guesthouses '7 and one who had also attended a training camp'7' had
seen their habeas petitions granted. After Al-Bihani, however, only one detainee
who had visited a guesthouse that was in any way associated with al-Qaeda was
released-and only because the district judge explicitly refused to apply Al-
Bihani's presumptions and the government chose not to appeal the grant.'" For
those detainees who trained at an al-Qaeda affiliated training camp, no peti-
tions have been granted since Al-Bihani.
The underlying facts of the three cases that predate Al-Bihani reveal pre-
cisely why such irrefutable presumptions are problematic and error prone. Of
these, Al Ginco v. Obama is especially illustrative.78 In Al Ginco, it is undisputed
that the petitioner stayed at al-Qaeda guesthouses and attended the Al Farouq
training camp.'7 9 Nonetheless, District Judge Leon did not find this evidence
sufficiently persuasive to justify Al Ginco's continued detention because Al Gin-
co was "tortured by al Qaeda into making a false 'confession' that he was a U.S.
spy, and imprisoned thereafter by the Taliban for over eighteen months at the
infamous Sarpusa prison in Kandahar.""so In defending his decision to not treat
as dispositive Al Ginco's attendance at either the training camp or his stay at al-
Qaeda guesthouses, Judge Leon noted that "[to say the least, five days at a
guesthouse in Kabul combined with eighteen days at a training camp does not
add up to a longstanding bond of brotherhood.". If Judge Leon had followed
the irrefutable presumptions that the Court of Appeals later developed in
Al-Bihani, Al Ginco would not have been released-regardless of his compelling
personal story and even though, as Judge Leon noted, the government's argu-
ment that he was "part of" the Taliban "defie[d] common sense.""
175. Farhi Saeed Bin Mohammed, Alia Ali Bin Ali Ahmed, and Abdulrahim Abdul Ra-
zak Al Ginco each had his petition granted in the District Court, even though the
Court found that each had visited or stayed at al-Qaeda affiliated guesthouses. See
Mohammed v. Obama, 689 F. Supp. 2d 38, 54 (D.D.C. 2009); Alia Ali Bin Ali
Ahmed, Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 65 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Ginco v. Ob-
ama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129 (D.D.C. 2009). While Mohammed was initially ap-
pealed, the government later dismissed the appeal. Both Ahmed and Al Ginco
were transferred out of Guantinamo Bay.
176. Al Ginco, 626 F. Supp. at 129.
177. Judge Kennedy, in Abdah v. Obama, 717 F. Supp. 2d 21, 22 & n.25, 27, 30, 34
(D.D.C. 2010), refused to accept the government's evidence that Issa House is a
bonafide al-Qaeda guesthouse, even though some al-Qaeda members may have
stayed there.
178. 626 F. Supp. 2d 123.
179. Id. at 129.
180. Id. at 127.
181. Id. at 129.
182. Id. at 128.
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Furthermore, the creation of these irrefutable presumptions distorts the
initial credibility determination a judge must undertake before deciding wheth-
er a particular detainee meets the preponderance of the evidence standard. In
the appeal of Almerfedi v. Obama, Judge Silberman disregarded the district
court's findings of fact that the government's intelligence reports claiming that
Almerfedi stayed in a Tehran guesthouse were "inherently unreliable."'^ In-
stead, Judge Silberman envisioned a mosaic that included Almerfedi's stay at an
al-Qaeda-affiliated guesthouse, which immediately triggered Al-Bihani's irre-
futable presumption that doing so is sufficient for detention.' Reliance on
such presumptions can upset the underlying credibility inquiry, adulterating
the judge's efforts to determine the reliability of the evidence before weighing its
relevance.
B. Capture Without Passport
Six months after Al-Bihani, the D.C. Circuit introduced its third irrefutable
evidentiary presumption in Al Odah v. United States, this one relating to detai-
nees captured without their passports."' When a detainee is captured without
his passport, the D.C. Circuit maintains that that fact is itself irrefutable evi-
dence of enemy combatant status, since "surrendering one's passport was 'stan-
dard al Qaeda and Taliban operating procedure' when checking into an al Qae-
da guesthouse in Afghanistan."' The problem with creating an irrefutable
presumption of unlawful enemy combatant status is that, before Al Odah, two
detainees who had either lost their passports or were captured without their
passports had their habeas petitions granted.8 1 In both cases, Judge Kollar-
Kotelly found the government's evidence insufficient to prove more likely than
not that the petitioners were indeed a part of al-Qaeda or its associated groups.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly granted these petitions despite the fact that it is "undis-
puted . . . that al Qaeda followed a standard operating procedure whereby indi-
viduals who entered al Qaida and Taliban-associated guesthouses would com-
monly surrender their passports,""' and despite the fact that each petitioner
had visited an al-Qaeda affiliated guesthouse. The reason Judge Kollar-Kotelly
183. Almerfedi v. Obama, 725 F. Supp. 2d 18, 25 (D.D.C. 2010).
184. "And, of course, that a petitioner trained at an al Qaeda camp or stayed at an al
Qaeda guesthouse 'overwhelmingly' would carry the government's burden."
Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F-3d 1, 6 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
185. 611 F.3d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2olo).
186. Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Al Odah, 611 F.3d at
15).
187. Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78, 96 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Rabiah v.
United States, 658 F. Supp. 2d 11, 42 (D.D.C. 2009).
188. Al Rabiah, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 40.
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granted the petitions-and why the government did not appeal her grants-is
because in each case individual circumstances made it clear that, far from being
bona fide members of al-Qaeda or its associated groups, the petitioners were
merely in the wrong place at the wrong time.
Caught in the aftermath of the American bombing campaign while on a
planned two-week humanitarian mission to Afghanistan, one of these petition-
ers, Fouad Mahmoud Al Rabiah, attempted to return to his home in Kuwait
multiple times, going so far as to send two letters to his family explaining that
he had lost his passport while staying at a guesthouse and asking them to tell his
supervisor at Kuwait Airlines, where he worked, that he would be back later
than he had originally planned. 9 Similar circumstances befell Khalid Abdullah
Mishal Al Mutairi, who traveled to Afghanistan for the purpose of building a
mosque and, while also staying in guesthouses and trusting local community
leaders, had his passport stolen in Kabul.'9 o In both cases, Judge Kollar-Kotelly
found that the individual circumstances of the petitioners' cases mitigated the
facts that each was captured without a passport and that each had stayed at
guesthouses that required the surrendering of passports.
The irrefutable presumption of unlawful enemy combatant status for those
arrested without a passport illustrates the general dangers inherent in creating
such strong evidentiary rules. There are a number of reasons why a detainee
may have lost his passport in Afghanistan and surrounding regions, and not all
of them indicate a tie to al-Qaeda. For a detainee to have any meaningful op-
portunity to contest his detention, he must be afforded the opportunity to at
least explain himself.'9 ' When a petitioner, like Al-Adahi, insists that he had his
passport on him when captured, but that his Pakistani bounty hunters'' seized
it upon his capture, he is given no opportunity to prove his case and refute the
government's evidence.'9 The use of such functionally dispositive rules reduces
the amount of evidence needed to find detention lawful. This, in turn, erases
whatever vestiges of due process remain from Boumediene.
189. Id. at 21-22.
190. Al Mutain, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 86-87.
191. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 728-29 (2008).
192. See, e.g., PERVEZ MUSHARRAF, IN THE LINE OF FIRE: A MEMOIR 237 (2006); Mark
Denbeaux et al., Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees
Through Analysis of Department of Defense Data 2-3 (Seton Hall Pub. Law, Re-
search Paper No. 46, 2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id
=885659 (providing statistics and noting use of large bounties).
193. Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. CIV.A 05-280 (GK), 2009 WL 2584685, at *15 n.21
(D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009) ("However, the arrest took place in a 'large, modern city,
with a large market area;' Petitioner had walked there after leaving the bus several
hours earlier.... He stated that he had his passport with him. [Redacted] This in-
consistency simply cannot be resolved. The underlying fact of his arrest by the Pa-
kistani military, however, is not in dispute." (internal citations omitted)).
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C. False Exculpatory Statements
The most recent irrefutable evidentiary presumption-and arguably the
most troubling-was established in Al-Adahi. There, Judge Randolph wrote
that "false exculpatory statements are evidence-often strong evidence-of
guilt." 94 Seven cases have relied on this rule to deny requests for habeas relief
since Al-Adahi, three of which were decided by District Court judges.'9 In an-
nouncing the rule, Judge Randolph cited two cases from other circuits to bolster
his view of false exculpatory statements: one from the Fifth Circuit'9' and one
from the Eighth Circuit.' 97 But there is a circuit split on this issue; in fact, the
Second and Ninth Circuits approach the issue quite differently. The Ninth Cir-
cuit has repeatedly held that "false statements," even when combined with other
incriminating evidence, are "weak circumstantial evidence because the innocent
as well as the guilty may lie when confronted with criminal charges."'9' Similar-
ly, the Second Circuit has held that:
[F]alsehoods told by a defendant in the hope of extricating himself
from suspicious circumstances are insufficient proof on which to con-
vict where other evidence of guilt is weak and the evidence before the
court is as hospitable to an interpretation consistent with the defen-
dant's innocence as it is to the Government's theory of guilt.'9 9
The Federal Jury Practice and Instructions similarly advise that when an excul-
patory statement is shown to be false:
[Y]ou may consider that there may be reasons-fully consistent with
innocence-that could cause a person to give a false statement showing
that [he] [she] did not commit a crime. Fear of law enforcement, reluc-
194. Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F-3d 1102, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
195. See Hentif v. Obama, 810 F. Supp. 2d 33, 43 (D.D.C. 2011); Hussein v. Obama, 821
F. Supp. 2d. 67, 78 (D.D.C. 2011); Kandari v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 2d 11, 35
(D.D.C. 2010).
196. United States v. Meyer, 733 F.2d 362, 363 (5th Cir. 1984) ("False exculpatory state-
ments may be used not only to impeach, but also as substantive evidence tending
to prove guilt.").
197. United States v. Penn, 974 F.2d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir. 1992) ("A false exculpatory
statement instruction is properly given when the defendant's exculpatory explana-
tion is later proven to be false.").
198. United States v. Lorea, 72 F.3d 136 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The evidence against appellant
was, in summary- presence, knowledge, nervousness, and false statements. But
numerous decisions of this circuit have held that that is not enough for a convic-
tion for aiding and abetting. There was no evidence of the required element of in-
tent from appellant's acts to assist the criminal enterprise.").
199. United States v. Di Stefano, 555 F.2d 1094, 1104 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting United
States v. Johnson, 513 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir. 1975)).
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tance to become involved, and simple mistake may cause a person who
has committed no crime to give such a statement or explanation.2 0 0
Clearly, the circuits do not agree on how to treat false exculpatory statements,
with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits more hawkish than the Second and Ninth,
and the practice manual counseling the dovish approach. Interestingly, the
Tenth Circuit is somewhere in the middle, recently holding that "[a]lthough
false exculpatory statements 'cannot be considered by the jury as direct evidence
of guilt,' such statements 'are admissible to prove circumstantially conscious-
ness of guilt or unlawful intent." 2 0 '
In treating false exculpatory statements as "substantive evidence tending to
prove guilt,"2 0 2 the Court of Appeals would be taking a stance in ordinary crim-
inal law that is not necessarily unsupported by other circuits, but one that is
certainly out of sync when considering that the majority of these "false exculpa-
tory statements" were made by petitioners who had been captured overseas and
often harshly interrogated. 03 When one considers the circumstances under
which the detainee's statements were given, their motives to lie become clear:
200. 1A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. § 14:o6 (6th ed.) (alterations in original).
201. United States v. Davis, 437 F.3d 989, 996 (loth Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Zang, 703 F.2d 1186, 1191 (loth Cir. 1982)).
202. United States v. Meyer, 733 F.2d 362, 363 (5th Cir. 1984).
203. See, e.g., Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 761 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("The court observed,
for example, that in Latifs 2009 declaration (in which he claimed to be too dis-
abled to fight) Latif said he 'spent three months at the Islamic Jordanian Hospital
in Amman, Jordan'... but his own medical records reveal that he was released
just five days after admission."). But see Hentif v. Obama, 810 F. Supp. 2d 33, 48
n-33 (D.D.C. 2011) ("Respondents counter that each of the descriptions Hentif
gave, described below, are vague. They argue this lack of specificity is evidence
that he was using counter-interrogation techniques and renders the information
he provided insignificant for purposes of determining whether his descriptions of
these men conflict with those given by other detainees."); Kandari v. United
States, 744 F. Supp. 2d 11, 35 (D.D.C. 2010) ("The Government has also introduced
evidence that the particular explanation provided by Al Kandari in this case is
consistent with al Qaeda counter-interrogation tactics .... Evidence that Al Kan-
dari provided an implausible explanation for his reasons for traveling to and his
activities within Afghanistan, and that the explanation provided is consistent with
al Qaeda counter-interrogation tactics, therefore supports a reasonable inference
that Al Kandari was not in Afghanistan solely to assist with, and did not engage
solely in, charitable work, as claimed."); Al Harbi v. Obama, No. CIV.A. 05-
02479(HHK), 2010 WL 2398883, at *9 (D.D.C. May 13, 2010) ("With respect to the
use of counterinterrogation techniques, the Court will not draw any conclusions
with so little indication of how often or for what purpose Mingazov may have
employed them. Mingazov's attempts to bargain with his interrogators about his
destination upon departure from Guantanamo Bay supports the proposition that
he wanted to be sent somewhere other than Russia.").
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"Deception often arises from fear, an emotion felt acutely in criminal inquiries,
and it typically aims at control, a desire central to the power struggle in an in-
vestigative interview."2 0 4
When confronting evidence from harsh interrogations, the judges in the
D.C. Circuit seem to hardly blink, treating them much as they would statements
made during an ordinary criminal investigation. Yet military and intelligence
interrogations differ profoundly from interrogations and depositions con-
ducted in the course of ordinary criminal investigations.2 o' Coercive interroga-
tions are almost sure to result in shifting, variable accounts of conduct, associa-
tions, and events.206 Detainees are not aware of what the government knows or
believes about them or even the standards of detention, and they cannot be sure
that they will ever go free if they do know something useful.2 0 Even in these cir-
cumstances, it is more likely that the innocent will tell a convenient lie over an
ambiguous truth.20 These concerns have long been recognized as the bases for
204. Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power, and Social Meaning, 97 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1515, 1519 (2009).
205. See Background Paper on CIA's Combined Use of Interrogation Techniques, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.aclu.org/files/projects
/foiasearch/pdf/DOJOLCOO1126.pdf. The report describes the CIA's interrogation
techniques to include forced nudity, sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation,
slaps, holds, grasps, "walling," water dousing, stress positions, wall standing, and
cramped confinement. Id. at 5-9. These techniques were employed individually
and in combination through at least 2004. See id. "The interrogators' objective is
to transition the [High Value Detainee] to a point where he is participating in a
predictable, reliable, and sustainable manner." Id. at 16.
206. See Watts v. State of Ind., 338 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in the
result) ("[NJo confession that has been obtained by any form of physical violence
to the person is reliable and hence no conviction should rest upon one obtained
in that manner. Such treatment not only breaks the will to conceal or lie, but may
even break the will to stand by the truth. Nor is it questioned that the same result
can sometimes be achieved by threats, promises, or inducements, which torture
the mind but put no scar on the body.").
207. See Al Odah v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, n1 (D.D.C. 2009) ("Detainee: I had
a visa for Pakistan. If I would have tried to go back, they would have questioned
me as to why I was in Afghanistan. It would have been difficult for me. It would
have been complicated. I was afraid of being accused of anything I might not have
done.").
208. Cf Rubin v. United States, 525 U.S. 990, 994 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) ("[T]he complexity of modern federal criminal law, codified
in several thousand sections of the United States Code and the virtually infinite
variety of factual circumstances that might trigger an investigation into a possible
violation of the law, make it difficult for anyone to know, in advance, just when a
particular set of statements might later appear (to a prosecutor) to be relevant to
some such investigation.").
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the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.2 o9 The Supreme
Court has emphasized that one of the Fifth Amendment's "basic functions ... is
to protect innocent men. . . 'who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous
circumstances," recognizing that "truthful responses of an innocent witness, as
well as those of a wrongdoer, may provide the government with incriminating
evidence from the speaker's own mouth.""o Even though the Fifth Amend-
ment's protections do not extend overseas, their rationales are no less availing
on the battlefields of Afghanistan than in the comforts of a police investigation
room in the United States.
In Uthman, for example, the petitioner lied about who paid for his plane
ticket to travel from Yemen to Afghanistan. Rather than admitting that a Ye-
meni sheikh-whom the government contends supports terrorism-funded his
trip, Uthman instead claimed that he "raised the funds himself primarily by
working at summer jobs selling food at a roadside shack."2 1 ' The District Court
conceded that this was unlikely, given that "Uthman would have had to earn
more than three times the average Yemeni's annual income in only a few sum-
mers' unskilled work."m2 Though the District Court concluded that Uthman
received the funds from the sheikh, it still found that, based on the record as a
whole, Uthman was not lawfully detainable. In a stinging reversal of the District
Court's grant of habeas corpus, Judge Kavanaugh cited to Al-Adahi for the
proposition that false exculpatory statements are substantive evidence of guilt.
The divide between the District Court and the Court of Appeals raises
troubling questions about a presumption of detainability based solely on peti-
tioner's lie. From one perspective, Uthman's "lies" were not even "exculpatory."
That is, the truth that a sheikh paid for his trip to Afghanistan was not actually
exculpatory, since the District Judge did not credit his statements, yet found
separately that his association with the sheikh was not grounds for detention.
Moreover, Uthman may have had no idea that the sheikh had any ties to terror-
ism, but simply did not want to get anyone in Yemen involved in his mess. Af-
ter all, he was well aware of the resources of the U.S. government, and could
imagine this sheikh, perhaps a respected member of his community, being
picked up because of Uthman's own admission. If Uthman had indeed lied, it is
understandable why he might have, especially under the pressure of intense in-
terrogation.
Furthermore, the government's evidence that the courts rely upon to de-
termine the falsity of exculpatory statements is sometimes inaccurate. In
Kandari v. United States, the petitioner disputed certain statements attributed to
209. U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person .. . shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself . . .").
210. Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001) (quoting Grunewald v. United States, 353
U.S. 391, 421-22 (1957)).
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him, arguing, "As to these statements, I can only say that they are not my
words."2 13 Though the court did not find Kandari's version of the facts credible,
it also did not take into account that the government report might be inaccu-
rate. When a false exculpatory statement is considered "strong evidence" of a
petitioner's guilt and government inaccuracies nonetheless exist, the risk of er-
ror increases dramatically.
CONCLUSION
Many have faulted Boumediene for its lack of clarity. In his dissent in Bou-
mediene, Chief Justice Roberts wrote,
Today the Court strikes down as inadequate the most generous set of
procedural protections ever afforded aliens detained by this country as
enemy combatants ... without bothering to say what due process rights
the detainees possess, without explaining how the statute fails to vindi-
cate those rights, and before a single petitioner has exhausted the pro-
cedures under the law. 214
Boumediene's ambiguity left some room for discretion in the lower courts in fa-
shioning the procedures that would govern the habeas petitions that would in-
evitably follow. As Judge Brown wrote in Al-Bihani, "[t]he Supreme Court ...
[left] the contours of the substantive and procedural law of detention open for
lower courts to shape in a common law fashion.""'
But on two points Boumediene was unmistakably clear. First, Boumediene
sought to check the executive's unilateral, unchecked detention authority."'
Second, Boumediene rested its faith in the courts' ability to check that authority
in the requirement that the executive come to court and produce the evidence
upon which the legality of detention is supposed to be founded.217 The Boume-
diene Court repeatedly returned to the notion that a judge's discretion over evi-
dentiary evaluation would be enough to both deter and reverse executive over-
reach. "
However, the evidentiary rules developed by the D.C. Circuit undermine
Boumediene by accepting weak and unreliable evidence. Under the D.C. Cir-
cuit's current evidentiary rules, the much-derided "Mobbs Declaration"-the
sole and insufficient basis for detaining Yassir Hamdi in Hamdi-would be ad-
213. Kandari v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 2d 11, 26 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Al
Kandari's declaration to the court).
214. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 8oi (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
215. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
216. Vladeck, supra note 15; see Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783.
217. 553 U.S. at 739-47.
218. Id. at 767, 773, 780-81, 783-84, 786, 789, 790-91.
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missible, relevant, and probably dispositive on the question of the lawfulness of
detention. The Circuit's evidentiary rules simply turn Boumediene inside-out.
As this Note has explained and highlighted, the remedy for the D.C. Cir-
cuit's evidentiary framework rests in the well-established rules and procedures
courts already use to ensure that evidence is credible enough and reliable
enough to support a finding by a preponderance-of-the-evidence. The D.C.
Circuit should reestablish rudimentary hearsay and corroboration require-
ments. It should also dispense with the mosaic theory and return to the ordi-
nary approach to weighing evidence. Finally, the D.C. Circuit should forego the
use of evidentiary presumptions and instead require the government to explain
the inferential chains that lead to the conclusion that staying at a guesthouse,
visiting a training camp, being captured without a passport, or lying to interro-
gators are evidence at all-let alone overwhelming or substantial evidence-of
membership in al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces. None of these re-
quirements is extraordinary; rather, they are the ordinary requirements of pre-
ponderance of the evidence employed by federal courts on a regular basis.
In the end, the effects and consequences of the evidentiary rules currently
applied in the D.C. Circuit are to deprive detainees the meaningful check on ex-
ecutive detention authority that Boumediene promised them nearly five years
ago.
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